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Abstract 
We present a novel temporal illusion in which the perceived order of events is dictated by 
their perceived causal relationship. Participants view a simple Michotte-style launching 
sequence featuring 3 objects, in which one object starts moving before its presumed cause. 
Not only did participants re-order the events in a causally consistent way, thus violating the 
objective temporal order, but they also failed to recognise the clip they had seen, preferring a 
clip in which temporal and causal order matched. Moreover, we show that the effect is not 
due to lack of attention to the presented events. In explaining the effect, we argue that low-
level cues to causality detected in a dynamic sequence as a whole trigger the search for causal 
hypotheses, selecting the simplest ones even at the expense of ignoring or altering sensory 
input. 
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Introduction 
Imagine watching a long queue of dominos falling one after another. Apparently, each 
domino’s fall is causing the fall of the next one in the queue. But suddenly one domino falls 
early, without being touched by the previous domino (Fig. 1). Would you see the domino’s 
premature fall?  
Figure 1: The temporal order (the 3/3 domino falls before the 2/2) does not match the assumed causal 
order (the 2/2 domino causes the fall of the 3/3). How do we resolve this incongruence? 
 
Whether or not causal impressions can influence the experienced temporal order depends on 
two questions: (1) Can the perception of temporal order be influenced by information other 
than the order of the percepts themselves, and (2) do causal impressions possess those 
features necessary to influence presumably lower level percepts?  
For some philosophers (Hoerl, 2013; Phillips, 2014; Soteriou, 2010), the answer to the first 
question is negative: the order of our experiences mirrors or inherits the temporal structure of 
the environment. Thus, to experience event A happening before B, we must perceive that 
particular temporal order, even if it is illusory, such as when a thunder is seen before it is 
heard. Others, however, have argued for a more constructed view of temporal order (Dainton, 
2010; Grush, 2007), i.e. for temporal order as a second-order judgement.  
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Despite this ongoing debate, experimental evidence from multisensory integration suggests 
that experienced temporal order is in fact malleable: when two successive bimodal stimuli are 
assumed to originate from the same source, the perceived timing of each stimulus is shifted 
so that the two events appear simultaneous (King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 2003). However, 
unlike the domino example above, the order here is collapsed rather than reversed, and, most 
importantly, the bimodal nature of the stimuli and the requirement for sensory integration 
introduce additional complications and allow for multiple interpretations. 
With regard to the second question, the role of causality in perception, several recent studies 
show that judgments of spatial relations (Scholl & Nakayama, 2004), size (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2010) trajectory (Kim, Feldman, & Singh, 2013) and, more relevantly, temporal 
duration (Buehner, 2012; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010) are sensitive to impressions of 
causality. In most cases, however, causal beliefs led to quantitative shifts, whereas reversing 
the order of events requires a stronger qualitative change. 
Nevertheless, Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2013) show that recently acquired causal 
knowledge can switch temporal order judgements. In their study participants played a 
computer-based puzzle game which required learning a novel causal relation between two 
events. After training, participants observed events happening in an order that violated the 
causal order of the learned relationship. When asked to report the order they saw, the 
majority preferred the order that matched their acquired causal beliefs, thus distorting the 
objective order of presentation.  
Does this reordering effect depend on recently learned causal rules or does it generalize to 
any case where strong causal beliefs are present? Similarly, does it depend on inference or 
can instances of causal perception (Michotte, 1963) also result in the reordering of events? 
Finally, did participants simply report the most plausible order of events guided by learned 
causal rules or did they actually perceive a different order to that presented to them? 
Experiment 1 
To evaluate the sensitivity of temporal order judgments to contradictory causal impressions, 
we modified the classic Michottean launching sequence  (Michotte, 1963) by adding a third 
object. Participants observed a three-object pseudo-collision where, critically, the third object 
starts moving before the second object, i.e. the effect takes place before its presumed cause 
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(Fig 2a). Following presentation, participants were asked to report the temporal order of the 
events they had just witnessed.  
Furthermore, to ensure that the order of events is perceptually distinguishable, as well as 
using relatively low speeds and long delays between critical events, we included a control 
condition in which object A is not present (Fig. 2b). In this case, we expected participants to 
report the veridical order of events since in the absence of A the causal direction is 
ambiguous. 
 
Figure 2: The sequences used in the two experiments: -a. Object A approaches B (I-II) and stops next to it 
at which point object C starts moving (III). After 350ms Object B starts moving (IV) and stops to the left 
of object C’s original position (V), -b. Identical to sequence (a) without object A -c. Identical to (a) but 
object B remains stationary throughout –d. Realistic 3-object collision shown during the review question 
in Experiment 2 (the arrows show the direction of movement and were not visible in the experiments) 
 
Participants and Materials  
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6 and conducted over the Internet using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (both experiments presented here can be seen at 
http://goo.gl/4noAmR).  
Based on past experiments (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013) and piloting data (using 
different parameters, however) we expected about 40% of participants in the experimental 
group to report the temporal order of events. Although we had no data regarding the 
behaviour of the control group, given the low velocity of objects and the great temporal gap 
between the critical events we hypothesized that the majority (~80%) would report the 
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correct temporal order. Thus, with a two sided-significance between 0.05-0.01 and a power of 
0.8, we calculated that about 27-38 participants would be required for each group. 
On that basis, we recruited 60 participants in total. A single participant was excluded from 
the analysis for providing a nonsensical answer to the order question (see Design and 
Procedure), i.e. not identifying correctly the first object that started moving. Of the remaining 
59 participants, 39 were male and 20 were female. The mean age was 32.39 (SD=9.96). Each 
participant was paid $0.50. 
Although it is relatively uncommon to conduct perceptual experiments online due to 
variability in hardware setups, we took special precautions in order to achieve uniform 
presentation of stimuli. To prevent object size discrepancies due to variable monitor sizes and 
resolutions each participant went through a calibration session (programmed in 
DHTML+Ajax). The procedure required participants to place a physical optical disc (CD, 
DVD etc), credit card or dollar note (all participants were from the US) on their monitor in 
order to match the size of the respective virtual object that appeared on screen. Using the 
provided controls they could increase or decrease the size of the virtual object to match it 
against the physical object. Since the size of these physical objects is standard, we compared 
the known dimensions of the selected physical object against that of the virtual object as 
defined by the participant. This gave us the effective ppi (pixels per inch) that we used to 
adapt the sizes of the objects that appeared in the main experiment and thus achieve 
consistent object dimensions for all participants. To verify correct calibration participants had 
to use a physical ruler to measure the size of an horizontal line that was displayed 
subsequently. Entering an incorrect value forced participants to repeat the calibration session.  
After successful calibration participants were asked to report their approximate physical 
distance from their monitor. The two options were: “I can more or less touch the screen if I 
extend my arm” and “I am further away from the screen”. Only one participant picked the 
second option. 
Regarding the potential temporal discrepancies, we recorded the frame rate while the critical 
sequence was presented as well as the actual delay between the onset of motion of objects C 
and B. There were minimal deviations: the average minimum frame rate was 29.70fps (target 
and maximum was 30fps) and the standard deviation was 0.36. Similarly the average actual 
delay was 352ms (target was 350ms) and the standard deviation 5.70. We nevertheless 
repeated the analysis that is reported in the results section after removing the single 
Running Head: TIME REORDERED  7 
 
participant who stated that she was seated far from the monitor and the 10 participants for 
whom the minimum frame rate dropped below 29fps at any point or for whom the recorded 
delay deviated by more than 10% (i.e. 35ms) from the 350ms target. The results of this 
stricter analysis were the same with those in the reported analysis. 
Design and Procedure 
The 59 participants were randomly assigned to one the two conditions that differed only in 
the displayed clip, resulting in 29 participants in condition 1 and 30 in condition 2. 
After completing the calibration section (see Participants and Methods) participants were 
welcomed to the experiment and were asked for some simple demographic data. They were 
then informed that they would watch a short movie clip and answer some questions about it. 
They were also asked to be as focused as possible since the clip would be displayed only 
once.  
Participants saw the clip a single time. In condition 1 (“A present”) that is shown in figure 2a, 
three 8x8mm squares fade in slowly (2sec). Object A is located 35mm to the left of object B 
and object C is located 16mm to the right of object B. The squares remained static for another 
2 seconds. Then object A starts moving to the right towards B at a speed of 30mm/sec, i.e. 
relatively slowly compared, for example, to the 300-400mm/sec in Michotte’s original 
studies. Object A stops adjacent to B and, immediately after, object C starts moving also at 
30mm/sec. After 350ms object B starts moving to the right at the same speed and stops to the 
left of object C’s original position. After C travels 35mm it comes to a halt and the clip ends. 
The clip was designed to be as similar as possible to a normal 3-object collision with the 
exception of the order of events between B and C. 
In condition 2 (“A absent”) the clip that was shown was exactly the same but object A was 
not present (Fig. 2b). Specifically, in this condition, object C starts moving to the right at 
30mm/sec and 350ms later B moves also to the right and stops next to C’s original position. 
C travels for 35mm and the clip ends. 
For each condition there were two similar versions of the target clip that differed only in the 
objects’ colours and the direction of movement. In the “normal” version the colours were as 
shown in Figure 2a (red-blue-purple) and the direction of movement was left-to-right as 
described above. In the “mirrored” version the colours were A=purple, B=red, C=blue and 
the direction of movement was right-to-left, meaning that the initial position of objects was 
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mirrored compared to the “normal”, i.e. A starts to the right of B and C to the left of object B. 
Participants in each condition were randomly assigned to one of the two clip versions. 
After watching the clip a single time, participants were shown the initial configuration of the 
objects (i.e. Fig. 2a-I or Fig. 2b-I) and were asked to place the events in the order that they 
saw them. To do this they had to drag-and-drop the event sentences “The red square started 
moving” (only in condition 1) , “The blue square started moving” and “The purple square 
started moving” from  their initial container to another box. The order of appearance of the 
sentences was randomised for each participant. Then participants were asked to indicate their 
confidence to the selected order by dragging a slider on a scale that was labelled “Not at all 
confident” to the left and “Very confident” to the rightmost position.  
In the next screen, the initial object configuration was shown again and participants were 
asked for their causal impressions for all possible object pairs (six in condition 1 and two in 
condition 2). These were expressed by dragging on a slider labelled “Completely Disagree”, 
“Neutral” and “Completely Agree” next to statements of the form “The X square made the Y 
square move”, were X and Y were colour pairs (e.g. “The red square made the blue square 
move”). Finally, participants were asked for any comment they had regarding the experiment 
and they were thanked for participating. 
Results 
Figure 3, shows the proportion of participants that reported the objective temporal (A-C-B) or 
the causal order (A-B-C) of events (we collapsed the normal and mirrored versions of the 
clips since no difference was observed). The overwhelming majority (82.76%) preferred the 
causal order when A was visible while a similar majority (83.33%) preferred the objective 
temporal order when A was absent, despite the fact that in both conditions the behaviour of 
objects B and C was identical (χ2(1, N = 59) = 25.77, p < .001). Furthermore, participants in 
both conditions were very confident in the order they have reported, with mean confidence 
ratings 78.76/100 (SD=24.62) for condition 1 and 73.63/100 (SD=21.05) for condition 2.  
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Figure 3: Proportion of participants that reported the correct (temporal) or the causal order of events in 
each condition. 
 
The direct causal judgments (Fig. 4) show that when A was present participants thought that 
it caused B to move (88.45%) and also that B caused C to move (77.28%). Participants were 
relatively indecisive about the A-C relationship (51.76%) but given the strong endorsement 
of the A-B and B-C relationships, one can assume that those endorsing it probably referred to 
the indirect A-C relationship, through B. The judgments for the inverse relationships were, as 
expected, very low. The C-B relationship is significantly higher than the C-A relationship 
(t(28)=2.305, p<0.05) and approaches significance compared with B-A (t(28)=2.007, 
p=0.054) but this is driven by those few participants who reported the correct temporal order 
of the sequence and any significant difference goes away if these participants are excluded.  
Similarly, when A was not present (condition 2) and, thus, when the majority of participants 
reported the objective temporal order of events, the causal judgments were far weaker. The 
strongest causal belief is in C making B move. In fact significantly more participants 
endorsed the C-B causal relationship in condition 2 compared to condition 1 (t(57)=4.837, 
p=0.000).  
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Figure 4: Mean causal judgments for each object pair per condition (in Condition 2, object A was not 
visible, so there are no ratings involving it). A value of 50 corresponds to neutrality – lower ratings 
indicate disagreement and higher rating indicate agreement with the causal statement (Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results indicate that spontaneous causal attribution can modify the perceived temporal 
order of events. The overwhelming majority of participants in the first condition reported the 
order that matched their causal impression, despite the fact that the actual temporal order was 
clearly perceivable, as both the long delay (350ms) between the events and the veridical 
ordering in condition 2 indicate. The causal basis of the reordering effect is further 
demonstrated by the strong endorsement of the statement according to which B made C 
move.  
Before attempting to explain and evaluate this finding, we need to address some potential 
confounds, especially related to attentional issues. First, the sequence becomes visually 
simpler in the absence of object A, therefore the erroneous temporal order reported in 
condition 1 could be attributed to the relative increase of perceptual load. Similarly, since 
motion and especially the onset of motion are known to attract attention (Abrams & Christ, 
2003; Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994), perhaps participants’ attention is drawn to object C when it 
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starts moving, thus completely missing B’s behaviour. According to either explanation, 
participants report not the order that they actually see but rather the most plausible order 
given the lack of information due to perceptual overload or split attention. In short, if 
participants miss part of the action, it makes sense to assume a causal relationship between 
events, given the starting/ending configuration, and thus report the order that matches this 
assumed relationship. Experiment 2 investigates these possibilities and applies a stricter test 
to the reordering effect. 
Experiment 2 
We again presented the 3-object sequence of Experiment 1 (Fig. 2a) but instead of asking 
participants for an explicit ordering of the events, we presented the same sequence again side-
by-side with a realistic collision sequence, i.e. a sequence in which the order of events is 
congruent with their causal relationships (Fig. 2d). After watching each of these sequences 
participants were asked to identify which of the two they saw earlier. 
In the second condition of this between-group experiment, we presented participants with a 
very similar sequence that differed only in that object B remains stationary throughout (Fig. 
2c). We hypothesised that the lack of motion would diminish the causal link between A and 
B as well as between B and C. In the absence of a causal interpretation, participants would be 
better at identifying the sequence they saw when asked to choose between that and a realistic 
collision. If this is the case, we will have evidence that the reordering effect observed in 
Experiment 1 and in the first condition of this experiment cannot be explained by lack of 
attention to B's behaviour. 
Participants and Materials  
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6 and conducted over the Internet using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
Based on results from Experiment 1, as few as 15 participants per group would suffice for a 
significant result at 0.01 and a power of 0.8. Nevertheless, given the radically different 
measure employed, we expected a far less pronounced effect. This prediction was confirmed 
in 3 pilot studies using speedier clips than before (65-100mm/sec). However, we also 
observed that while for the control group the proportion of correct answers increased as the 
speed of objects decreased (56%-64%), no such correlation was observed in the experimental 
group. Given that our aim was to make the presented clips as perceptually clear as possible, 
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we decided to keep the parameters the same as in Experiment 1 and also keep the number of 
participants constant based on our earlier calculations. 
Thus, we recruited 60 participants in total. Two were excluded from the analysis because in 
the critical question they did not watch one of the two sequences that they were asked to 
choose from so their answers were in fact random (see Design and Procedure). Of the 
remaining 58 participants, 31 were male and 27 were female. The mean age was 34.57 
(SD=12.12). Each participant was paid $0.50. 
The same precautionary measures as in Experiment 1 were taken and the same values were 
recorded during the experiment. The mean minimum frame rate was 29.63fps (SD=0.39) and 
the mean delay between the movements of objects C and B was 351.03ms (SD=5.22). Lastly, 
no participant reported that their distance from the monitor was greater than an arm’s reach. 
As in Experiment 1 we repeated the analysis that is reported in the results section after 
removing the 6 participants for whom the minimum frame rate dropped below 29fps at any 
point or for whom the actual delay deviated by more than 10% (i.e. 35ms) from the 350ms 
target. The results of this stricter analysis remained the same.  
Design and Procedure 
The 58 participants were randomly assigned to one the two conditions that differed only in 
the critical clip, resulting in 29 participants in each condition. The introductory screens were 
the same as in Experiment 1 and participants were asked to pay attention to the clip that 
would be shown a single time.  
In condition 1 (“B moving”) the clip was identical to the clip shown in the first condition of 
Experiment 1 (Fig. 2a). In condition 2 (“B static”) the clip was similar with the exception that 
B remained static throughout the sequence (Fig. 2c). So, object A approaches from the left at 
30mm/sec and stops next to B at which point C starts moving at the same speed. The clip 
ends when object C stops after 35mm. As in Experiment 1 there were two versions of each 
clip, one with the colours being red, blue and purple and direction left-to-right as in Figure 2 
and another version were the colours were shuffled (A=purple, B=red, C=blue) and the 
direction of movement was right-to-left. 
After watching the clip, participants proceeded to the “review” screen in which two clips 
were displayed side-by-side. One of the clips was the critical clip that they had just seen and 
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the other was a clip featuring a realistic three-object collision: Object A approaches from the 
left at 30mm/sec and stops next to B at which point B starts moving to the right and stops 
next to C, following which C starts moving to the right (Fig. 2d). So, in condition 1 the 
participants had to choose between two clips that differed only in the order in which B and C 
started moving (Fig. 2a vs Fig. 2d), while the difference in condition 2 was mainly whether 
object B moved or not (Fig. 2c vs Fig. 2d). Below each clip there was a “play” button and 
participants were allowed to watch each clip as many times as they wanted before reporting 
which of the two they had seen in the previous screen. Then participants were asked to 
indicate their confidence by dragging a slider on a scale that was labelled “Not at all 
confident” to the left and “Very confident” to the rightmost position. Finally, participants 
were asked for direct causal judgments for each pair of objects in the clip, as in Experiment 1.  
Results 
The proportion of participants that correctly identified the clip they saw was 37.93% for 
condition 1 and 72.41% for condition 2, as shown in figure 51. These two conditions were 
significantly different: χ2(1, N = 58) = 6.97, p = .008. Again participants were confident in 
their choice: the mean confidence rating was 74.10/100 (SD=23.15) for condition 1 and 
81.21/100 (SD=22.40) for condition 2. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of participants that selected the correct clip (the one they saw) or the “realistic” 
collision clip in each condition. 
                                                 
1 Again, we collapsed the responses to the normal and the mirrored versions of the clips since no difference was 
observed. 
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Regarding the causal ratings, for condition 1 they are almost identical to the respective 
ratings in Experiment 1: Participants agree strongly that A caused B to move and that B 
caused C to move, while being relatively neutral in the indirect A-C relationship and giving 
very low ratings to the inverse relationships. For condition 2, since B did not move at all, 
these causal questions are rather ambiguous and the answers participants gave to some extent 
reflect this ambiguity by being around the midpoint mark for all relationships with 
compatible temporal order (A-B, B-C and A-C). In any case there does not seem to be a 
prevalent causal perception in condition 2.  
Figure 6: Mean causal judgments for each object pair per condition. A value of 50 corresponds to 
neutrality – lower ratings indicate disagreement and higher rating indicate agreement with the causal 
statement (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 
Discussion 
Compared to Experiment 1 the reordering effect this time was less pronounced but perhaps 
more impressive, given the different measure that we used. Participants in condition 1 saw a 
clip featuring relatively slow moving objects (30mm/sec) in which object C moves 350ms 
before object B, but failed to identify the clip they saw, choosing instead with high 
confidence a clip in which B moves earlier, and, most critically, appears to be launching C. 
The fact that when asked to report the order of events (Exp. 1) rather than identify the clip 
they saw (Exp. 2), participants show an even stronger preference for the causal order can be 
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explained, in our view, by the nature of the measure. It is likely that some people do detect a 
‘glitch’ in the clip when they first experience it, some deviation from an ideal collision clip, 
but they still don’t identify the deviation to be the order of the events. Thus, when asked to 
choose between that clip and a realistic collision, these participants might prefer the deviant 
one, the one they actually saw, not because of the order, as the results of Experiment 1 show, 
but because it is the one that does not “look right”. This hypothesis is supported by the direct 
causal judgments that remained roughly the same between the two experiments. 
The most important finding from this experiment is that the reordering effect cannot be 
explained by split attention. When B remains stationary in condition 2 the majority of 
participants detect it and thus are able to correctly identify the clip they saw. This means that 
in condition 1, where B does move towards C, albeit late, its motion is in fact noticed and the 
subsequent reordering does depend on that detection. All the events that take place in the 
sequence are actually registered by the perceptual system and all are necessary for the causal 
impression to be formed; events need to be seen in order to be reordered.  
General Discussion 
In two experiments we have provided evidence that spontaneous causal attribution can 
influence the perception of temporal order. The causal reordering effect (Bechlivanidis & 
Lagnado, 2013) seems to generalize to situations where strong causal beliefs are present, 
irrespective of whether the causal links are recently learned or directly perceived.  
The effect is not due to limitations of the perceptual system, since the relative onset of the 
events that are reordered is clearly perceivable in the absence of causal incongruences. 
Moreover, it is not the case that causation is driving attention away from the critical events: 
participants are in fact reporting their experience rather than an educated guess based on 
fragmented perceptual input. All the events are, in fact, perceived and are subsequently 
reordered to fit a causal interpretation. Finally, we have shown that the effect is strong 
enough to result in the formation of a mental representation of the reordered sequence: the 
majority of participants failed to recognise the sequence they experienced seconds earlier and 
were very confident that they had seen the sequence in which the temporal order matches the 
causal order. 
These results point to an interpreted view of temporal order perception. If, as hypothesized, 
there exists a distinct mechanism for order discrimination (Mitrani, Shekerdjiiski, & 
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Yakimoff, 1986), it seems plausible that inputs to that mechanism include richer sources of 
information besides direct sensory input. Alternatively, rather than causal representations 
influencing the generation of temporal order judgements, there might be no spontaneous 
representation of temporal order at all. Since the temporal priority principle (causes precede 
their effects) allows for order judgements to be inferred retrospectively, then perhaps it is 
only causality that is represented.  
Why are causal impressions formed in the first place though? Even if we ignore the order of 
events, the target sequence features other extreme spatiotemporal deviations from ideal 
collisions. According to current models of causal perception (see Rips, 2011 for a review) 
such deviations should neither be tolerated by a modular input analyser (Michotte, 1963; 
Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) nor allow for a match against stored causal schemata (Sanborn, 
Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013; Weir, 1978; White, 2006).  
White’s (2014) more recent approach may provide a solution to this conundrum by 
specifying 14 low level cues to causality. Many of those cues are present in our target 
sequence even if they are not instantiated by the appropriate objects. So, for example, there is 
“contact between actor and object” (cue 5) and “property transmission” (cue 8) despite the 
fact that upon contact between objects A and B, the momentum is phenomenally transmitted 
to a third object C.  
Nevertheless, if the presence of those cues triggers the search for a causal interpretation then 
ignoring spatiotemporal deviations and more interestingly reordering the events will result in 
the simplest representation of the observed sequence (Chater & Vitányi, 2003; Lombrozo, 
2007). Rather than object A launching C from distance and object B moving spontaneously 
or being pulled by C, A will be represented as launching B followed by B launching C. The 
latter interpretation is clearly simpler by involving two instances of a single type of causal 
relationship and furthermore by matching a causal schema, similar to a queue of dominos 
falling. 
In sum, we propose that the detection of abstract low level cues to causality (White, 2014) in 
a sequence as a whole, triggers the search for familiar causal representations (schemata). If 
compatible schemata matching the sensory data are unavailable, the simplest representations 
will be selected at the expense of overlooking deviations, even if it results in the modification 
of the objective temporal order. 
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